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INTRODUCTION

James Speet does not live an enviable life.' Mr. Speet lives in Grand
Rapids, Michigan, 2 a city that was recently named the best city in the
United States to raise a family.3 This accolade likely makes little
difference to Mr. Speet, who has been homeless for quite some time.4 Mr.
Speet lives off of food stamps, odd jobs, and the charity of the
community.5 To make matters even more difficult for Mr. Speet, his
struggle to survive often puts him at odds with the law. 6 Mr. Speet does
not steal, sell drugs, or take any action that most people in society would
consider to be criminal; Mr. Speet's alleged criminal activity stems from
holding up signs that read "Cold and Hungry, God Bless" and "Need Job,
God Bless." 7
Until recently, holding up a sign asking for money constituted
criminal activity in the state of Michigan under Michigan's long-standing
anti-begging statute.8 A violation of the statute subjected the offender to
"imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than
$500.00, or both."9 Luckily for Mr. Speet, Michigan's anti-begging
1. See Speet v. Schuette, 889 F. Supp. 2d 969, 972 (W.D. Mich. 2012).
2. Id.
3. Tom Van Riper, The Best Cities for Raising a Family, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/2012/04/04/the-best-cities-for-raising-a-family/.
4. Speet, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 972-73.
7. Id.
8. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.167(1)(g), (h) (2014).
9. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.168(1) (2014); see § 750.167.
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statute was found to be facially unconstitutional, so he can no longer be
prosecuted for begging in Grand Rapids.' 0 Sadly, however, Mr. Speet's
legal history is not uncommon as many cities and states have laws
criminalizing begging."
There are legitimate reasons for communities to restrict begging in
public places.1 2 One of the primary arguments in favor of restricting
begging is to combat fraudulent or dishonest beggars.' 3 Panhandlers' 4 can
also have a negative impact on business' 5 and create traffic and other
public safety hazards.16
This Note discusses whether begging is protected speech under the
First Amendment" and the moral implications of punishing an individual
for attempting to survive.18 In addition, this Note addresses how the
legislature and judiciary should balance the interests of society against
the interests of beggars.1 9 This issue necessarily invokes the historical
10. Speet, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 979-80 (ruling that Michigan's anti-begging statute was
unconstitutional

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments

because it provided

an

impermissible "blanket restriction[]" on speech). The Sixth Circuit recently affirmed the Western
District of Michigan's decision. Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 880 (6th Cir. 2013).
11.

Homes Not Handcuffs: The CriminalizationofHomelessness in U.S. Cities,NAT'L LAW

CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY & NAT'L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS 10 (July 2009),

http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/CrimzReport 2009.pdf [hereinafter
Homes Not Handcuffs] (stating that almost half of 235 surveyed cities have restrictions on begging
in public places). Apathy is also a major problem facing the homeless. Nancy A. Millich,
CompassionFatigueand the FirstAmendment: Are the Homeless ConstitutionalCastaways?, 27

U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 258 ("The perception of much of the public is that programs offering
help to the homeless are unsuccessful and that the more money communities spend on
homelessness, the more this problem grows.").
12.

See infra Part II.A.

13. See Speet, 726 F.3d at 879. The problems of dishonest beggars or panhandlers have
been well-documented recently in the media. One dishonest panhandler alleges that he made
$60,000.00 in a year by panhandling. Ron Dicker, PanhandlerShane Warren Speegle Says He
Made

$60,000

a

Year

Begging

on Street,

HUFFINGTON

POST

(July

23,

2012),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/23/shane-warren-speegle-says n 1694577.html.
14. The terms "panhandler" and "beggar" are used interchangeably throughout this Note,
generally to describe individuals who ask people for money.
15.

Chad Silber, PanhandlersAffecting Downtown Business, DIGTRIAD.COM (Sept. 24,

2013), http://www.digtriad.com/news/local/article/299954/57/Panhandlers-Affecting-Downtow
n-Business (covering the negative impacts on Greensboro, North Carolina businesses caused by
the presence of panhandlers near stores).
16. Roadside Panhandlinga Traffic Danger, CBS CHICAGO (Jan. 10, 2011, 6:16 PM),
(exposing the
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2011/01/10/roadside-panhandling-a-traffic-danger/
dangers of begging near traffic to motorists and panhandlers).
17. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The First Amendment protection of freedom of speech was
extended to apply to the individual states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, by the Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
18.

See infra PartV.

19.

See infra Parts VI, VII.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

454

[Vol. 26

problem of the "[t]yranny of the [m]ajority." 2 0 This Note proposes that
courts extend First Amendment protection to begging and that antibegging laws and subject laws that restrict begging in the places most
commonly frequented by beggars be subject to strict scrutiny. 2 1 While
there are legitimate societal reasons for restricting begging in public
places, 2 2 restrictions that extinguish or severely limit the speech of
individuals that must rely on the charity of others to simply survive
outweigh any advocated societal interests. 2 3 The First Amendment should
protect begging as a form of speech, which some individuals must use
simply to survive. Subjecting anti-begging laws to strict scrutiny properly
balances legitimate societal interests in restricting begging against an
individual's struggle to survive.
Part I considers different state laws and municipal ordinances that
prohibit or restrict begging in public places. 2 4 Part II examines the
purposes and effectiveness of anti-begging laws. 2 5 Part III considers
Supreme Court precedent on whether solicitation by an individual is a
protected form of free speech under the First Amendment. 2 6 Part IV
analyzes how different circuit courts have applied Supreme Court
precedent to address the issue. 2 7 Part V proposes classifying begging as
speech and extending First Amendment protection. 2 8 Part VI proposes
subjecting anti-begging laws to strict scrutiny because most begging
occurs in a public forum. 2 9 Finally, Part VII suggests possible methods of
reform for municipalities. 3 0

I. AN OVERVIEW OF DIFFERENT STATE AND MUNICIPALITY
APPROACHES TO
ANTI-BEGGING LAWS

Many cities in the United States have restrictions of some degree on

20.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 427 (Eduardo Nolla ed., James T.

Schleifer trans., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2012) (1835).
21.

"[L]aws ...

subjected to strict scrutiny .

.

. will be sustained only if they are suitably

tailored to serve a compelling state interest." City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)).
22.
23.
24.
25.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 13, 15, and 16; infra Part II.A.
infra Part V.B.
infra Part 1.
infra Part II.

26.

See infra Part Ill.

27.
28.
29.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.

30.

See infra Part VII.
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begging or panhandling.' These restrictions vary from prohibiting
begging in specific public places to prohibitions on aggressive
panhandling to complete city or state-wide bans. 32 This discussion will
categorize anti-begging laws 33 based on the level of restriction they create
with regards to the locations and times that an individual may beg.
Michigan's anti-begging law was an example of an extremely restrictive
law because it imposed a state-wide ban on begging. 34 In contrast, laws
that only restrict begging in particular places or times may be categorized
as less restrictive because these laws do not completely proscribe begging
in the municipality or state. 35 Anti-begging laws range in restrictiveness
from complete bans to restrictions on where, when, and how an individual
may beg. 36
A. Highly Restrictive Anti-Begging Laws
In classifying anti-begging laws by restrictiveness, laws that
completely prohibit begging in a municipality or state are the most
restrictive since begging is prohibited throughout the jurisdiction. 37
Municipality-wide prohibitions on begging are fairly common.3 8 These
laws would require an individual who wishes to beg to leave the
jurisdiction to avoid violating the law. 39

31. See Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 11, at 10; A Dream Denied: The Criminalization
of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, NAT'L COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS & NAT'L LAW CTR. ON
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY 9-10 (Jan. 2006), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/
crimreport/report.pdf [hereinafter A Dream Denied].
32. See Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 11, at 165-71; A Dream Denied, supra note 3 1,

at 135-45. Michigan's long-standing anti-begging law was an example of a state-wide ban on
begging. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.167(l)(g), (h) (2014).
33. The term "anti-begging laws" is used in this Note to generally describe statutes and
ordinances that proscribe, limit, or restrict begging or panhandling by an individual.
34. § 750.167(1)(g), (h). Michigan's anti-begging law stated: "A person is a disorderly
person if the person is ... [a] vagrant [or] ... found begging in a public place." Id.
35. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(b)(2) (2013) (proscribing
solicitation, begging, and panhandling on transit services in New York City).
36. For a more detailed look at the different restrictions by city on begging and the
homeless in general, The National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty and The National
Coalition for the Homeless have compiled a convenient "Prohibited Conduct Chart" outlining the
different restrictive laws in major cities in the United States, see Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note
11, at 165-71. See also A Dream Denied, supra note 31, at 135-45.

37. One example is Michigan's anti-begging statute that was recently held
unconstitutional. See § 750.167(1)(g), (h).
38. See A Dream Denied, supra note 31, at 135-45; Homes Not Handcuffs, supranote 11,
at 165-71.
39. For example, because Michigan's anti-begging statute imposed a state-wide ban on all
forms of begging in public places, there were no public places in Michigan where a person could
beg without violating the law. See § 750.167(1)(h).
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1. Michigan's Unconstitutional Anti-Begging Statute
One of the most restrictive and furthest reaching anti-begging laws
was Michigan's now-unconstitutional anti-begging statute. 40 Michigan's
anti-begging statute provided that either "[a] vagrant" 4 1 or "[a] person
found begging in a public place" is "a disorderly person." 42 The penalty
for being "convicted of being a disorderly person is ... imprisonment for
not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both."4 3
Since the anti-begging statute extended to "vagrant[s]" 44 -"a person
without a settled home or regular work who wanders from place to place
and lives by begging" 45 -an individual could feasibly have violated
Michigan's anti-begging statute without ever actually being caught in the
act of begging. 46 Furthermore, Michigan's anti-begging statute was farreaching in that it proscribed begging anywhere in the state of
Michigan. 4 7
2. Montpelier, Vermont's Anti-Begging Ordinance
Even cities in traditionally liberal stateS 48 have highly restrictive antibegging laws that completely proscribe begging in public throughout the
municipality. 49 For example, Montpelier, Vermont's anti-begging
ordinance states, "no person shall beg, or solicit the gift of money or any
other thing, or exhibit himself for the purpose of inciting pity, in or on a
street or public place, or other place of public resort, without the
permission of the chief of police."50 As such, the Montpelier ordinance

40. § 750.167(1)(g), (h). Michigan's anti-begging statute was found unconstitutional in
Speet v. Schuette, 889 F. Supp. 2d 969, 979-80 (W.D. Mich. 2012), aff'd, 726 F.3d 867 (6th Cir.
2013).
41. § 750.167(1)(g).
42. § 750.167(1)(h).
43. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.168(1) (2014).
44. § 750.167(1)(h).
45. Definition of vagrant in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionarie
s.com/us/definition/american english/vagrant?q=vagrant.

46. The extension of Michigan's anti-begging law to cover vagrants allows a law
enforcement officer to identify an individual who fit the profile of a beggar, arrest that individual,
and charge him or her as being a disorderly person. See § 750.167(1)(h).
47.
48.

§

750.167(1)(g), (h).
See Frank James, MississippiMost ConservativeState, Vermont Most Liberal: Gallup,

NPR (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2011/02/25/134054868/mississipp
i-most-conservative-state-vermont-most-liberal ("The most liberal state as measured by the
percentage of voters who claim that label was Vermont at 30.5 percent.").
49. MONTPELIER, VT., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. VII, § 11-708 (1996); see also
Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 11, at 165-71; A Dream Denied, supra note 31, at 135-45.
50. MONTPELIER, VT., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. I1, art. VII, § 11-708 (1996).

AIN'T TOO PROUD TO BEG? ANTI-BEGGING LAWS' FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEM

2015]

457

completely proscribes public begging city-wide.5 ' Violations of the
Montpelier anti-begging ordinance subjects the offender to "a fine of not
less than one dollar ($1.00) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500.00),
or by imprisonment of not less than one (1) day nor more than thirty (30)
days." 52 As a result, Montpelier, Vermont's anti-begging ordinance is
highly restrictive because it bans every form of begging in public
throughout the municipality-effectively requiring those who must beg
to survive to leave the municipality to avoid violating the ordinance. 5 3
B. Less Restrictive Anti-Begging Laws
In contrast to highly restrictive anti-begging laws, 54 the following less
restrictive anti-begging laws place restrictions on an individual's ability
to beg without implementing a complete ban on begging in public areas
throughout the municipality or state. These anti-begging laws are less
restrictive because they impose "time, place, or manner" restrictions on
where, when, and how an individual may beg. These less restrictive
anti-begging laws are more narrowly tailored to address specific issues
than a total ban on begging.
1. New York's Anti-Begging Regulation
New York's anti-begging regulation presents a prime example of a
less restrictive anti-begging law.5 6 It states, "no person . . . shall engage

in . . the solicitation of money or payment for food, goods, services or
entertainment. No person shall panhandle or beg upon any facility or
conveyance." 5 7 At first glance, New York's anti-begging regulation
appears highly restrictive; however, this regulation is limited in scope and
applies only to property under the control of the New York City Transit
Authority and Bronx Surface Transit Authority (collectively referred to
as the NYCTA). 5 8 Therefore, New York's anti-begging regulation only
proscribes begging in transit authority facilities, such as subways.6 0
Furthermore, the NYCTA states that the purpose of this regulation is "to
promote safety, to facilitate proper use of the transit facilities of the
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Ch. 1, § 1-9(a).
Ch. 11, art. ViI, § 11-708.

54.
55.

See supra Part L.A.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

56. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21,
57. Id.
58. Tit. 21, § 1050.1(b).
59. Tit. 21, § 1050.6(b)(2).
60.

2013).

§ 1050.6(b)(2) (2013).

See METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORiTY, http://new.mta.info/ (last visited Oct. 29,
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authorities, to protect those transit facilities and their passengers, and to
assure the payment of fares and other lawful charges for the use of their
systems." 6 Therefore, New York's anti-begging regulation is less
restrictive than a city wide ban because it only proscribes in NYCTA
areas and is designed to remedy a specific problem. 62
2. Fort Lauderdale, Florida's Anti-Begging Ordinance
Fort Lauderdale, Florida's anti-begging ordinance restricts the places
where a person may beg and the manner of how a person may beg. 63 The
Fort Lauderdale ordinance proscribes aggressive panhandling, 64 general
panhandling, 6 5 and panhandling in specified areas of the city.66 A
violation of the ordinance subjects the individual to "a fine not to exceed
five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment for a term not to
exceed sixty (60) days or by both such fine and imprisonment." 67
However, the ordinance provides that "[p]anhandling does not mean the
act of passively standing or sitting, performing music, or singing with a
sign or other indication that a donation is being sought, but without an
vocal request other than a response to an inquiry by another person."
Therefore, the Fort Lauderdale ordinance prohibits all solicitation for
money by an individual in specified areas of the city, except when the
individual is accepting donations while performing music or not actively
soliciting donations. 6 9
3. Los Angeles, California and Chicago, Illinois's AntiBegging Ordinances
Los Angeles, California has also enacted a similar less restrictive antibegging ordinance.7 0 The ordinance prohibits aggressive begging,
61.
62.

Tit. 21,
Tit. 21,

§ 1050.1(b).
§§ 1050.1(b), 1050.6(b)(2).

63. FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 16, art. IV, § 16-71(b)(3) (1953),
available at https://www.municode.com/library/fl/fort lauderdale/codes/codeofordinances?

nodeld=COORCH16MIPROFARTIVOFINPUPEOR S16-71DICO (stating that panhandling
is an act of disorderly conduct).
64. Ch. 16, art. IV, §§ 16-82(a)(l)-(5) (defining aggressive panhandling).
65. Ch. 16, art. IV, §§ 16-82(a)(l)-(2) (defining non-aggressive panhandling).
66. Ch. 16, art. IV, § 16-82(b) (specifying areas where panhandling is prohibited).
67. Ch. 1, § 1-6(c) (1953), available at https://www.municode.com/library/fl/fort
lauderdale/codes/code of ordinances?nodeld=COORCHIGEPRSl-6PEVI.
68. ch. 16, art. IV, § 16-82(a).
69. ch. 16, art. IV, §§ 16-82(a)-(b).
70.

L.A., CAL., L.A. MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 1,

§ 41.59

(1997), availableat http://www.am

legal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Califomia/lamc/municipalcode?f-templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid
=amlegal:losangeles ca_mc.
71. § 41.59(b).
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solicitation at s ecific locations, such as banks,72 motor vehicles, public
transportation, and restaurants.
Furthermore, the ordinance also
includes restrictions on when an individual can beg because it prohibits
begging in certain areas after dark.76 Similarly, Chicago's anti-begging
ordinance prohibits begging in specified public areas, such as bus stops,
public transportation, gas stations, ATMs, and restaurants. Therefore,
New York,78 Fort Lauderdale, Florida,7 9 Los Angeles, California,"o and
Chicago, Illinois' have anti-begging statutes that are less restrictive than
a blanket municipality-wide prohibition on begging because their
restrictions are directed at "the time, place, or manner" 82 of where, when,
or how an individual may beg.
II. PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY ANTI-BEGGING LAWS AND
THEIR CONSEQUENCES

Many cities have some form of anti-begging law. 83 These laws were
enacted to address some perceived societal problems because beggars
often make people feel uncomfortable and raise public safety and
economic concerns. 84 These laws, however, have consequences, and their
enforcement raises legitimate moral concerns.8 5
A. Problems Addressed by Anti-Begging Laws
Panhandlers present several problems in society. 86 One problem is that
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

§ 41.59(c)(1).
§ 41.59(c)(2)(A).
§ 41.59(c)(3).
§ 41.59(c)(4).
§ 41.59(c)(2)(AA) ("No person shall solicit, ask or beg in any public parking lot or

structure any time after dark. 'After dark' means any time from one-half hour after sunset to one-

half hour before sunrise.").
77. CHLI, ILL., MUN. CODE, ch. 8-4, § 025(b)(1) (2004), available at http://www.amlegal.
com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/chicagoil/municipalcodeofchicago?f-templates$fn=default.htm$3
.0$vid=amlegal:chicago_il.
78. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(b)(2) (2013).

§§

79.

FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 16, art. IV,

80.
81.
82.

L.A., CAL., L.A. MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 1, § 41.59 (1997).
CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE, ch. 8-4, § 025(b)(1) (2004).
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).

16-82(a)-(b) (2012).

83.

See supra Part I; A Dream Denied, supra note 31, at 135-45 (charting various forms

of prohibited conduct that particularly affect the poor and homeless, including anti-begging laws,
for a number of cities in the United States); Homes Not Handcuffs, supranote 11, at 165-71.
84. See infra Part II.A.
85. See infra Part II.B.
86. See generally MICHAEL S. Scorr, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES
FOR POLICE PROBLEM-SPECIFIC GUIDES SERIES, PANHANDLING 1-5 (2003), available at
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panhandlers intimidate people.8 7 Most people can imagine a time when
they were approached by a beggar and felt uncomfortable.8 8 There are
several factors that can influence the level of intimidation felt by people
due to panhandlers, such as the "time of day," whether the targeted person
is alone, "the physical appearance of the panhandler," and "the number
of panhandlers." 89 When people feel intimidated by the presence of
panhandlers, they are more likely to take actions to avoid encounters with
panhandlers in the first place. 90 These strategies include entirely avoiding
areas where panhandlers are known to be present, 91 pretending to be
talking on a cell phone, wearing headphones, and avoiding eye contact. 9 2
Additionally, one commentator has noted that "panhandling may
unintentionally worsen race relations in cities where panhandlers are
disproportionately black." 93 Thus, panhandling presents legitimate
problems for communities. 94
Because people are likely to go out of their way to avoid
panhandlers, 95 panhandlers can also have a negative effect on businesses
located near the areas where they beg. 96 The presence of panhandlers near
businesses can effectively ruin a business because businesses cannot
survive "if shoppers [are] unwilling to cross the phalanx of importuning
street people" to enter the business. 97 If businesses that once served the
community are forced to close, then residents of that community will be
forced to look elsewhere to fill the void of services created by their
absence. 98 Panhandlers' presence near businesses does not just affect the
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd rom/inaction l/pubs/Panhandling.pdf.
87. Id at 4-5.
88. See Paul, Facingan Uncomfortable Reality: Beggars, LIFE INA SACK (July 9, 2010),
http://lifeinasack.net/facing-an-uncomfortable-reality-beggars/.

89.
90.
91.
92.

SCOTr, supra note 86, at 4-5.
Id. at 4.
Id
Id

93.

Robert C. Ellickson, ControllingChronicMisconduct in City Spaces: OfPanhandlers,

Skid Rows, and Public-SpaceZoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1181 (1996).
94. See generally SCOTT, supra note 86, at 1-5.
95. Id at 4.
96. The problems of panhandling on business have led to the production of guides on
preventing panhandling for businesses. For an example, see NANCY G. LAVIGNE ET AL.,
PREVENTING PANHANDLING 3 (2007), available at http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/

alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001191-Preventing-Panhandling.PDF.
97.

GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOwS: RESTORING

ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 31 (1996). Michigan's Attorney General, Bill

Schuette, also raised this argument when Michigan's anti-begging law was constitutionally
challenged. See Speet v. Schuette, 889 F. Supp. 2d 969, 973 (W.D. Mich. 2012) ("According to
the government, the [anti-begging] ban helps businesses, because the presence of people begging
in or near business establishments may deter others from patronizing those businesses.").
98. This result is a natural consequence of a local business closing. For example, if your
local grocery store closes, then necessarily you will be forced to purchase your groceries
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individual business owners-their presence may also negatively affect
the surrounding neighborhood. 99 For example, approximately 60% of
people who live in New York City stated that their quality of life has been
diminished by the presence of panhandlers and beggars. 0 0
Moreover, the presence of panhandlers also has the potential to lead
to an increase in crime.10 Increased crime in an area leads to lower
property values1 0 2 and is also a reason why people move away from an
area. 0 3 An extreme-but possible-result is the creation of blighted
areas, which foster even greater risks of crime.' 0 4
Anti-begging laws also address the issue of dishonest beggars.'0 o Not
all panhandlers are homeless, and not all homeless people panhandle. 0 6
Panhandlers, however, present a problem to society because they "are
notoriously prone to engage in fraud" to exploit society's generosity
toward the poor.'o7 Fraud by panhandlers ranges from asking for money
for food because they are hungry and then using the money for drugs or
alcohol to pretending to be homeless to exploit charitable donations. 0 8
Issues of fraud by panhandlers have become so prevalent in some
communities that charitable organizations have instructed citizens not to
donate money to the panhandlers themselves-but to charitable
organizations instead.1 09
elsewhere.
99. KELLING & COLES, supra note 97, at 31. See; see also Silber, supra note 15.
100. KELLING & COLES, supra note 97, at 13.

101. See id. at 20.
102. See generally ROBERT J. SHAPIRO AND KEVIN A. HASSETT, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
REDUCING VIOLENT CRIME: A CASE STUDY OF 8 AMERICAN CITIES (June 2012), available at

http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/violent_crime.pdf
(describing the impact of crime on the value of real estate).
103. Christine MacDonald, Poll: Crime Drives DetroitersOut; 40% Expect to Leave Within
5 Years, DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 9, 2012, 6:42 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/article/

20121009/METROO 1/210090369/1409/rss36.
104. Detroit, Michigan has some of the largest areas of blight in the United States. For an
overview of some of the problems created by blight, see generally Nick Carey, DetroitArea's
Battle with Blight May Be Key

to Survival, REUTERS (July 25, 2013,

12:17 AM),

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/25/us-usa-detroit-blight-idUSBRE96002T20130725.
105. See Speet v. Schuette, 889 F. Supp. 2d 969, 973 (W.D. Mich. 2012); Dicker, supra note
13.
106. SCOrr, supra note 86, at 6 ("Contrary to common belief, panhandlers and homeless
people are not necessarily one and the same. Many studies have found that only a small percentage
of homeless people panhandle, and only a small percentage of panhandlers are homeless.").
107. Ellickson, supra note 93, at 1231.
108. SCOrr, supra note 86, at 6. Michigan's Attomey General also claimed that one of the

purposes of Michigan's anti-begging law was to "prevent fraud, because beggars may not use the
contributions for the purposes donors intend.... [Slome beggars may use such contributions for
alcohol and illegal drugs." Speet v. Schuette, 889 F. Supp. 2d 969, 973 (W.D. Mich. 2012).
109. Joanne Fagan, PanhandlingHelps and How to Really Help the Poor and Homeless,

EVA'S VILLAGE BLOG (Sept. 19, 2012), http://evasvillage.org/wordpress/cost-panhandling-poor-
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Finally, aggressive panhandling is another problem addressed by antibegging laws.' 10 Aggressive panhandling is defined as "soliciting
coercively, with actual or implied threats, or menacing actions.""' If an
aggressive panhandler decides to use physical force or is overly
aggressive, he or she could actually be committing robbery.112
Aggressive panhandlers have become a major problem in urban areas. 113
Aggressive panhandlers increase the level of intimidation felt by
pedestrians because they might "touch, shove, or respond with hostility
or bigotry if one declines to give money."ll 4 Since aggressive
panhandlers increase the level of intimidation felt by individuals,
aggressive panhandlers can lead to decreases in foot traffic and business
for the stores they are near because would-be patrons are more likely to
avoid those stores in order to avoid being hassled or intimidated."l 5 As a
result, panhandlers, in general, present legitimate problems for
communities. 116
B. What are the Consequences ofAnti-Begging Laws?
Every law has consequences-intended, unintended, positive, and
negative." 7 Anti-begging laws are no different. Like other laws, antibegging laws have moral implications and a socioeconomic impact on
society." 8 An examination of the consequences of anti-begging laws
illuminates that anti-begging laws are a largely ineffective remedy to the

homeless/. See also Sasha Goldstein, Bogus Beggar is so Good at His Scam He Makes $100,000
a Year Trolling Kentucky City (VIDEO), N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 27, 2013, 3:47 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/beggar-scams-kentucky-town-article-1.1275097.
110. Scorr, supra note 86, at 1.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. For example, aggressive panhandling was the most-committed crime in Ann Arbor,
Michigan in the summer of 2010. Ryan J. Stanton, Ann Arbor Officials Reconvene Task Force to
Look at Problems ofAggressive PanhandlingDowntown, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Sept. 21,2010,6:20

AM), http://www.annarbor.com/news/ann-arbor-officials-reconvene-task-force-to-look-at-probl
em-of-aggressive-panhandling-downtown/.
114. Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and Civility and Public Spaces: A Constitutional

Approach to Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REV. 285, 288-90 (1993).
115. Lizzy Alfs, Aggressive Panhandling, Crime Are Driving Away Customers, Liberty
Street Retailers Say, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Sept. 25, 2011, 6:45 AM), http://www.annarbor.com/

business-review/panhandling-in-downtown-ann-arbor-hurts-businesses-on-liberty-street-owner
s-say/.
116. See, e.g., SCorr, supra note 86, at 1; Stanton, supra note 113; Teir, supra note 114, at
288-90; Alfs, supra note 115.
117. See generally Robert K. Merton, The UnanticipatedConsequences ofPurposive Social

Action, 1 Am. Soc. REV. 894 (1936) (discussing the reality of unanticipated consequences in any
purposive social action).
118. See generally id.
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problems that begging has on the community.1
Clearly, one of the negative consequences of anti-begging laws for
beggars is the creation of a penalty, in the form of a fine, jail time, or
both, for a violation of the law on individuals who are simply trying to
survive.1 20 Enforcement of these laws raises legitimate moral questions
and concerns. For example, anti-begging laws would surely fail to satisfy
Kant's Categorical Imperativel 2 1because as a society we would not want
to wholly outlaw solicitation of charitable donations. 122 Furthermore,
under a sentimentalist or moral sense theory approach,1 23 it seems
inherently wrong to punish someone who is forced to rely on the charity
of others to survive.1 24 Also, some donors may be negatively affected if
begging is criminalized because donors might receive some spiritual or
emotional benefit by giving to panhandlers.1 2 5
Another negative consequence of anti-begging laws is that they are
not cost effective.' 26 Individuals who are forced to rely on the charity of
others to survive are not financially capable of paying any fines imposed
on them.1 27 Furthermore, there are costs associated with enforcement of
the law in the form of paying law enforcement officers to enforce the law

119. See supra Part II.A.

120. For examples of different penalties imposed by various states and municipalities for
violations of anti-begging laws, see supra Part I.
121. "The categorical imperative is thus only a single one, and specifically this: Act only in
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a
universal law." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 37 (Allen W.

Wood ed. & trans., Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785), available at http://www.inp.uw.edu.pl/
mdsie/PoliticalThought/Kant%20-%20groundwork%20for%20the%20metaphysics%20of%o20
morals%20with%20essays.pdf. Interestingly, one commentator has also proposed that the act of
begging itself "is a morally dubious activity" according to Kant's Categorical Imperative.
Ellickson, supranote 93, at 1182. "[I]f everyone were to try and survive as an unproductive person
living off the charity of others, all would starve." Id.
122. If we applied anti-begging laws as a Categorical Imperative, necessarily any form of
solicitation would violate the maxim, including solicitation requests made by charitable
organizations, political organizations, and religious organizations.
123. "[S]ince vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of
ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to
mark the difference betwixt them." DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 258-59 (John

P. Wright et al. eds., Everyman Paperbacks 2003) (1740).
124. See Millich, supra note 31, at 280; Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to
Differ: The FirstAmendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARv. L. REv. 896, 897, 899-900 (1991).
125. Ellickson, supra note 93, at 1179 ("Some donors undoubtedly take affirmative pleasure
in satisfying request for a handout."). See also Simone Sanner, GOP-ControlledSC ChargesFees,
Requires Permits to Feed Homeless, AMERICANS AGAINST THE TEA PARTY (Feb. 13, 2014),

http://aattp.org/gop-controlled-se-charges-fees-requires-permits-to-feed-homeless/
(discussing
the effects of a permit requirement to feed the homeless in Columbia, South Carolina on donors).
126. See A Dream Denied, supra note 3 1, at 11.

127. For examples of the measures of fines imposed for violations of anti-begging statutes,
see supra Part I.
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as well as court costs. 128 Additionally, if the offender is sentenced to jail
time, then taxpayer dollars are used to coverjail costs, which can be quite
high.1 2 9
Further, it is unlikely that anti-begging laws have substantial deterrent
value.1 30 Panhandlers that must beg and rely on charity to survive do not
have much-if anything-left to lose. The threat of a fine is meaningless
when one is only concerned about surviving and has no means to pay the
fine.' 3 ' Similarly, the threat of imprisonment is unlikely to deter an
individual from begging because, at the very least, he or she will receive
meals and a warm bed during the time in jail.1 32
In contrast, from a societal perspective, one positive consequence of
anti-begging laws is that law enforcement officers have the ability to
enforce the law. If a law enforcement officer receives a complaint from a
citizen or business about a panhandler, then the officer can enforce the
law and remove the offender-just like any other criminal.1 3 3
Additionally, anti-begging laws can help prevent business owners from
losing business due to panhandlingl 3 4 because business owners have the
ability to remove panhandlers who are scaring away business from the
128. These costs vary based on how heavily the law is enforced. For example, law
enforcement officers in Grand Rapids, Michigan "enforced [Michigan's anti-begging] law 399
times between Jan. 1, 2008 and May 24, 2011." Bob Brenzing & Matt Campbell, GrandRapids
Police Stop Enforcing Begging Law, WZZM13 ABC (Aug. 28, 2012, 7:13 AM), http://archive.
wzzml3.com/news/article/223034/14/judge-rules-panhandling-law-unconstitutional.
129. In Randall County, Texas, it "costs taxpayers around $65 per day per inmate" to cover
the operating costs of "housing, clothes, meals, basic medical care and other necessities." Shannel
Douglas, Inmates Cost Taxpayers $65 Per Day, COMABC 7 NEWS (Nov. 20, 2012),
http://abc7amarillo.com/news/local/inmates-cost-taxpayers-65-per-day?id=827668.
Instead of
the costs of jail time, New York City has attempted to address its homelessness problems by
spending some of its resources not on food and shelter but by flying homeless families to live with
relatives elsewhere-even internationally. Julie Bosman, City Aids Homeless with One-Way
Tickets Home, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/29/nyregion/29
oneway.html.
130. One of the primary reasons for punishment is deterrence. Kent Greenawalt,
Punishment, in JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 35 (5th ed. 2009).

"Knowledge that punishment will follow crime deters people from committing crimes, thus
reducing future violations of right and the unhappiness and insecurity they would cause." Id.
131. For example, James Speet was arrested in January 2011 for violating Michigan's antibegging statute, was unable to pay the fine, and spent four days in jail. Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d
867, 871 (6th Cir. 2013). A few months later, in June 2011, Speet was arrested again for violating
Michigan's anti-begging statute. Id.
132. While beggars who require the charity of others to survive will probably not be deterred
by the threat of imprisonment, dishonest beggars-those that are not homeless or starving-might
be deterred from begging by anti-begging laws if they are faced with punishment by
imprisonment.

133. See supra Part I (discussing various anti-begging laws and their accompanying
penalties).

134. See supra Part II.A.
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area. 135 The ability to enforce the law can be a particularly positive tool
in situations where aggressive panhandlers are harassing pedestrians.' 36
III. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON WHETHER SOLICITATION BY AN
INDIVIDUAL IS PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The Supreme Court has not directly decided the issue of whether
begging by an individual is protected speech under the First
Amendment.1 3 7 The Court has ruled on a number of occasions that
solicitation by charitable organizations is protected speech under the First
Amendment.1 3 8 These rulings, however, have been qualified based on the
fact that requests for solicitation by charitable organizations also involve
a component of disseminating ideas or advocating causesl39
component which may not necessarily be present when a panhandler
attempts to solicit funds.
A. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment
In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the
Supreme Court did not directly consider whether begging by an
individual is protected speech under the First Amendment, but the Court
considered whether solicitation of alms by a charitable organization is
protected speech under the First Amendment. 140 The Village of
Schaumburg (the Village) passed an ordinance that required charitable
organizations seeking solicitations to apply and obtain a permit.141
Solicitation without a permit would result in "a fine of up to $500 for
each offense." 42 Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), a non-profit
135. Realistically, an anti-begging law allows a business owner to attempt to scare away
panhandlers without ever involving law enforcement because a threat to call the police by a
business owner might be sufficient to convince the panhandler to vacate the area.
136. See supra Part II.A.
137. Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 2013) ("While the United States Supreme
Court has not ...

directly decided the question of whether the First Amendment protects soliciting

alms when done by an individual, the Court has held-repeatedly-that the First Amendment
protects charitable solicitation performed by organizations.").
138. See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980);
Sec'y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 959 (1984); Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the
Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 788-89 (1988); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725
(1990) (plurality opinion).
139. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
140. Id. at 623.
141. Id. To obtain a permit, the ordinance required the applicant to include 'proof that at
least seventy-five percent of the proceeds of such solicitations will be used directly for the
charitable purpose of the organization."' Id. at 624 (quoting the ordinance).
142. Id at 624.
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environmental organization, sought to solicit in the Village and applied
for a permit to do so.1 43 When the Village denied CBE's application for
a permit, CBE brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on
the basis that the Village's ordinance was unconstitutional on First and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds.'44
After reviewing previous decisions involving freedom of speech, the
Supreme Court held "that charitable appeals for funds, on the street or
door to door, involve a variety of speech interests-communication of
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and
the advocacy of causes-that are within the protection of the First
Amendment." 45 Therefore, the Court established that solicitation by
charitable organizations is protected speech under the First Amendment
and affirmed the decisions of the lower courts in finding that the
ordinance violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.1 46 Importantly,
the Court limited its decision in one key aspect.1 4 7
The Court qualified its holding by stating that "because charitable
solicitation does more than inform private economic decisions and is not
primarily concerned with providing information about the characteristics
and costs of goods and services, it has not been dealt with in our cases as
a variety of purely commercial speech." 4 8 As a result, the Court
distinguished charitable solicitation from commercial speech because
charitable solicitation "is intertwined with informative and perhaps
persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular
views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that
without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would
likely cease." 1 49 Therefore, the Court alluded to the notion that
solicitation of funds by itself may not necessarily be protected speechbut the accompaniment of the request for a donation with "informative
and perhaps persuasive speech" is what extends the protection of the First
Amendment.1 50 However, the Court did not specifically articulate a level
of scrutiny that laws regulating charitable solicitation would be subject
to. 5' 1
143. Id. at 625.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 632.
146. Id. at 632, 639.
147. See id. at 632.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Similarly, Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, argues that the ordinance is valid
because it "deals not with the dissemination of ideas, but rather with the solicitation of money."
Id. at 641 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This statement provides another allusion to the notion that
mere solicitation for money without any informative or persuasive speech may not be protected
speech under the First Amendment.

151. See id. at 632 (majority opinion) ("Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject
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Therefore, Village of Schaumburg did not conclusively hold that
solicitation of money, in general, is protected speech under the First
Amendment.1 52 Instead, the Court stated that charitable solicitation is
protected speech under the First Amendment because the act of
solicitation of funds by a charitable organization is accompanied by
"economic, political, or social" speech that is within the protection of the
First Amendment.1 53 Therefore, the Court did not directly address
whether solicitation or begging by an individual-without more-would
be protected speech under the First Amendment, but the Court did
provide some framework on the issue.15 4
B. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
The Court considered the constitutionality-under the First
Amendment-of regulations that limited the locations where charitable
organizations may solicit funds in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee.1 5 5 The International Society for Krishna
Consciousness (ISKCON) challenged the constitutionality of a regulation
of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) that
prohibited distributing flyers or soliciting funds within several major
New York City area airports on the grounds that the regulation violated
the First Amendment.' 5 ISKCON is a non-profit religious organization
whose members participate in a "ritual" that requires members to
distribute religious brochures and solicit funds for the organization in
to reasonable regulation . . . ."). However, one scholar has suggested that the Court "articulated a
content-neutral intermediate scrutiny test." John D. Inazu, Making Sense ofSchaumburg: Seeking
Coherence in FirstAmendment CharitableSolicitationLaw, 92 MARQ. L. REv. 551, 560 (2009).
Additionally, Justice Rehnquist further expounded on the standard established in Village of
Schaumburg four months after it was decided by suggesting that Village of Schaumburg

articulated a strict scrutiny standard. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 476-77 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). "[T]his Court has upheld state authority to restrict the time, place, and manner of
speech, if those regulations 'protect a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression
of free expression' and are narrowly tailored, limiting the restrictions to those reasonably

necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest." Id. (quoting Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S.
348, 354 (1980)) (citing Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 620).
152. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674 (1992).
156. Id. at 675-76. "The Port Authority owns and operates .. . John F. Kennedy International
Airport[,] . . . La Guardia Airport[,] . . . and Newark International Airport." Id at 675. The
regulation prohibited the following conduct within airport terminals "if conducted by a person to
or with passers-by in a continuous or repetitive manner: . . . '(b) The sale or distribution of flyers,
brochures, pamphlets books or any other printed or written material. (c) The solicitation and
receipt of funds."' Id at 675-76 (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925
F.2d 576; 578-97 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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public places.' 5 7 The Port Authority's regulation rohibits ISKCON from
performing its "ritual" inside airport terminals.1
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ISKCON on
the basis that the airport terminals constituted a public forum, which
subjected the regulation to strict scrutiny.1 59 The Second Circuit affirmed
in part and reversed in part on the basis "that the terminals are not public
fora,"l 60 and therefore, the regulation was only subject to rational basis
review.16 1 On this basis, the Second Circuit held "that the ban on
solicitation was reasonable, but the ban on distribution was not."1 62 Both
parties petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, and the Supreme
Court granted both petitions.1 6 3
The Supreme Court held that ISKCON's "ritual" qualified as
protected speech under the First Amendment. 164 The Court's analysis
primarily focused on whether the airport terminals constituted public fora
because regulations on speech in public fora are subject to strict
scrutiny.' 65 Regulations on speech outside a public forum, however, are
subject only to rational basis review. 1 66
The Court provided some criteria in determining whether an area
constitutes a public forum.1 6 7 First, "a traditional public forum is property
that has as 'a principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas."" 'Public

access to government-owned property, by itself, does not create a public

157. Id. at 674-75. The "ritual [is] known as sankirtan."Id at 674.
158. Id. at 676.
159. Id. at 676-77 (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 721 F. Supp.
572, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). Regulations on speech in a public forum are subject to strict scrutiny.
See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 54-55 (1983).
160. While both "fora" and "forums" are both correct plural forms of "forum," this note uses
"fora" as the plural form of "forum" to be consistent with the Supreme Court's use. See Definition
offorum in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/engli
sh/forum.
161. Int'l Soc 'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 677 (citing Int'l Soc'y for

Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 925 F.2d at 576).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. It is important to note that the solicitation by ISKCON members in this case clearly
carries some aspect of "the dissemination and propagation of views[,] ... ideas, and .. . advocacy
of causes" as stated in Village ofSchaumburg v. Citizensfor a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620,

632 (1980) because ISKCON members were soliciting funds while "disseminating religious
literature," Int'l Soc 'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 674-75. However, the Court

does not state in its opinion whether the act of solicitation on its own by ISKCON members,
absent the distribution of leaflets, would be protected speech under the First Amendment. See id.
165. See id at 678-79.
166. Id. at 679.
167. Id.
168. Id (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985)).
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forum.1 69 Although, a "separation from acknowledged public areas may
serve to indicate that the separated property is a special enclave, subject
to greater restriction."" 0 Based on these criteria, the Court determined
that airport terminals are not public fora because airports have not
historically been used for speech activities."
Therefore, the Port Authority's regulations only needed to be
reasonable to avoid constitutional violation.1 72 The Court upheld the
Second Circuit's decision that the ban on solicitation was reasonable
because solicitation may have a disruptive effect on business and "faceto-face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an appropriate target
of regulation." 73 Thus, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision
and upheld the ban on solicitation as reasonable under rational basis
review. 174
In a separate opinion, the Court held that the Port Authority's ban on
distribution of leaflets violated the First Amendment. 7 1 Justice
O'Connor distinguished solicitation of funds from distribution of leaflets
because "leafletting does not entail the same kinds of problems presented
by face-to-face solicitation." 7 6 This distinction is due to the fact that the
act of handing out leaflets does not require the recipient to cease
movement.17 7 Justice O'Connor found the Port Authority's general
blanket ban on distribution of leaflets to be unreasonable; however,
"regulations of the time, place, and manner of leafletting" would likely
be constitutional under rational basis review.1 78
Therefore, the Court did not explicitly provide that the act of
solicitation on its own was protected speech under the First
Amendment.' 7 9 The Court, however, did provide some framework to
169. Id. at 679-80 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)).
170. Id. at 680 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1983)).
171. Id It is unlikely that airport terminals will ever qualify as public fora due to the
implementation of heightened security measures at airports after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks. See generally Loma Thackeray, 9/11 Transformation:Airport security transformed by
9/11, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Sept. 11, 2011), http://billingsgazette.com/news/local/ airport-securitytransformed-by/article_7dl9ed26-893d-5fdb-ac53-4f554daa9a6e.html.
172. Id. at 683.
173. Id. at 684.
174. Id. at 685.
175. Lee v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992). In its
holding, the Court relied on the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor, the opinion of Justice
Kennedy concurring in the judgment, and the dissenting opinion ofJustice Souter in International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685, 693, 709 (1992) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (Souter, J., dissenting). Lee, 505 U.S. at
831.
176. Int'l Soc 'yfor KrishnaConsciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 692.
179. See supra note 164.
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determine which areas may be considered public fora for First
Amendment purposes. 80 Also, the Court distinguished face-to-face
solicitation from the distribution of leaflets on the basis of the differences
in the nature of the interaction between the two activities.' 8 1
IV. CIRCUIT COURT INTERPRETATIONS

In the absence of clear authority from the Supreme Court,1 82 the circuit
courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's decisions in different ways.
There have been differing opinions as to whether begging constitutes
speech or conduct. Courts that have viewed begging as speech have
invoked strict scrutiny to review regulations on begging, while courts that
have viewed begging as conduct have subjected regulations limiting
begging to rational basis review. 183
A. Young v. New York City Transit Authority
In Young, the Second Circuit evaluated whether the NYCTA
"prohibition of begging and panhandling in the New York City subway
system violate[d] the First Amendment." 184 The district court granted
plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that
"begging constitutes a type of speech that merits the full protection of the
First Amendment" and declared the prohibition unconstitutional.1 8 5 The
NYCTA appealed the district court's decision to the Second Circuit.1 86
On appeal, the Second Circuit first considered whether begging
constitutes speech or conduct.' 8 7 The Second Circuit began "by
expressing grave doubt as to whether begging and panhandling in the
subway are sufficiently imbued with a communicative character to justify
constitutional protection."' 88 In considering "whether begging constitutes
the kind of 'expressive conduct' protected to some extent by the First
Amendment," the Second Circuit relied on "[c]ommon sense" in finding
180. Int'l Soc'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 679-80.

181. Id at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
182. See supra Part III.
183. See infra Part V. Compare Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 154 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that begging is conduct and not protected speech under the First Amendment),
with Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 875 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that begging is protected speech
under the First Amendment).
184. Young, 903 F.2d at 147. For a more detailed examination of the NYCTA anti-begging
regulation, see supra Part I.B.1.
185. Young, 903 F.2d at 148, 152.
186. Id. at 147.
187. Id at 152-53.
188. Id. at 153.
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that begging constitutes conduct-not speech.1 89 To determine what
expressive conduct is protected by the First Amendment, the question is
"[whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it." 90 After reviewing Supreme Court
precedent extending First Amendment protection to expressive
conduct,' 9 ' the Second Circuit noted "the conduct ... formed a clear and
particularized political or social message very much understood by those
who viewed it." 1 92 Therefore, the Second Circuit narrowly interpreted
Supreme Court precedent to extend First Amendment protection to
conduct only in situations where the conduct was "inextricably joined"
with a particularized message.1 93
The Second Circuit held that "begging is not inseparably intertwined
with a 'particularized message.' It seems fair to say that most individuals
who beg are not doing so to convey any social or political message.
Rather, they beg to collect money."' 94 The Second Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the act of begging conveyed any sort of
particularized political or social message because "there hardly seems to
be a 'great likelihood' that the subway passengers who witness the
conduct are able to discern what the particularized message might be."' 95
The Second Circuit further stated that even if the beggar attempted to
convey a particularized message, the message would be ignored because
people on the subway view begging as a form of harassment.' 96 The
Second Circuit concluded that begging is conduct-not speech-because
"[w]hether with or without words, the object of begging and panhandling
is the transfer of money." 97 Therefore, the Second Circuit found that
begging is conduct that is not subject to First Amendment protection. 198
The Second Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
Supreme Court extended protection to solicitation in Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environmentl99 on the basis that
189. Id
190. Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)) (alteration in
original).
191. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (burning flags); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (wearing black arm-bands to protest the
Vietnam War); Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 509 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 313-14 (1968) (protesting unfair labor practices); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 14142 (1966) (conducting a sit-in to protest segregation).
192. Young, 903 F.2d at 153.
193. Id
194. Id.
195. Id. at 153-54.
196. See id at 154.
197. Id
198. Id at 153-54.
199. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633 (1980); see also
supra Part IllI.A.
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begging on the subway was not "intertwined with informative and
perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for
particular views on economic, political, or social issues." 200 Therefore,
the Second Circuit held that begging constituted conduct-not speechand also held that the NYCTA anti-begging regulation did not violate the
First Amendment. 20 1
B. Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida
In a similar case, plaintiffs challenged-on First Amendment
grounds-a Fort Lauderdale, Florida ordinance 202 that prohibited
panhandling on the beach.20 3 The Eleventh Circuit, however, determined
that "[f]ike other charitable solicitation, begging is speech entitled to First
Amendment protection. "204 The Eleventh Circuit also ruled that the
ordinance "restrict[ed] speech in a public forum." 205 However, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the ordinance's "restrictions on begging in the
Fort Lauderdale Beach area [were] narrowly tailored to serve the City's
interest in providing a safe, pleasant environment and eliminating
nuisance activity on the beach."
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held
that begging was speech entitled to First Amendment protection but that
the ordinance did not violate the First Amendment because it was
narrowly tailored to withstand strict scrutiny review. 207
C. Speet v. Schuette
In Speet v. Schuette, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a finding that
Michigan's anti-begging statute was unconstitutional on the basis that the
statute violated the First Amendment by banning speech-in the form of
begging-in a public forum. 20 8 Plaintiffs James Speet 209 and Ernest Sims
brought suit facially challenging the constitutionality of Michigan's anti-

200. Young, 903 F.2d at 155 (quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632).
201. Id. at 153, 164.
202. For a more detailed discussion of the ordinance in question, see supra Part I.A.2. The
Fort Lauderdale, Florida ordinance prohibits all solicitation for money by an individual, except
when the individual is accepting donations while performing music or is not actively soliciting
donations. See FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 16, art. IV,

§

16-82(a) (2012).

203. Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 177 F.3d 954, 955 (1Ith Cir. 1999).
204. Id. at 956 (citing Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993);
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)).
205. Smith, 177 F.3d at 956.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 957.
208. Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 880 (6th Cir. 2013).
209. See supra Introduction.
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begging statute 2 10 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.211 The district
court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and Michigan
Attorney General Bill Schuette appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 2 12 After
acknowledging that the Supreme Court has never "directly decided the
question of whether the First Amendment protects soliciting alms when
done by an individual," the Sixth Circuit "h[e]ld that begging, or the
soliciting of alms, is a form of solicitation that the First Amendment
protects." 213 The Sixth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's decision
in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environmen l 4 "as
holding that 'charitable solicitation is protected because it is
characteristically intertwined with . . . speech seeking support for

particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social
views."'215
As a result, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Village of Schaumburg as
holding that charitable solicitation necessarily contains speech and
extended First Amendment protection to begging by individuals. 2 16
Furthermore, Michigan's anti-begging statute-as a state-wide banrestricted speech in public fora. 2 17 As a blanket ban on all forms of
begging throughout the state, Michigan's anti-begging statute was not
narrowly tailored to serve its legitimate state interests and, therefore,
unconstitutionally violated the First Amendment. 2 18
V. Is BEGGING CONDUCT

OR SPEECH?

To determine whether begging is protected speech under the First
Amendment, the first question to resolve is whether begging constitutes
conduct or speech.2 19 If begging is classified as inexpressive conduct,
210. MICH. COMP. LAWS

§ 750.167(1)(g), (h) (2014). For a more detailed discussion, see

supra Part I.A. 1.

211. Speet, 726 F.3d at 871.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 874, 878.
214. 440 U.S. 620, 632 (1980). Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S.
620 (1980).
215. Speet, 726 F.3d at 877 (quoting Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 165 (2d
Cir. 1990) (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S.
at 632).
216. Id. Michigan's Attorney General, Bill Schuette, did not petition the Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari within 90 days of the Sixth Circuit's decision as required by Sup. CT. R. 13, so
the decision of the Sixth Circuit is final.
217. Id. at 880.
218. Id
219. For the purposes of this Part, "conduct" is considered as actions that are not subject to
First Amendment protection. "Speech" will be considered as actions that are subject to First
Amendment protection.
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then it will not be entitled to First Amendment protection. 220 However, if
begging inherently communicates speech interests, then begging is
entitled to First Amendment protection. 22 1
A. Arguments in Favor of ClassifyingBegging as Inexpressive Conduct
There are two factors that support a finding that begging is
inexpressive conduct. First, it is unlikely that the audience of the begging
perceives any expressive elements from the beggar. 222 Second, the intent
of the beggar is not to disseminate information-it is to obtain money.2 23
Perhaps the strongest arguments in favor of classifying begging as
inexpressive conduct are those put forth by the Second Circuit in Young
v. New York City TransitAuthority.224
The Young court strongly considered the audience of the panhandlers
in finding that begging constituted inexpressive conduct. 2 25 The fact that
most individuals view panhandlers as intimidating 226 certainly supports
the Young court's view that "the conduct of begging and panhandling [is]
totally independent of any particularized message." 227 Indeed, the Young
court felt that most targets of panhandlers pay no attention to whether the
panhandlers are trying to convey any message because the targets
"experience [panhandler requests] as threatening, harassing and
intimidating." 2 8 As a result, if the target audience only views the request
as harassment, any expressive message to the request will be ignored or
will not be perceived.2 2 9 Arguably, the more aggressive the panhandler,2 3 0
the less receptive the target will be to any potential message conveyed by
the panhandler because the target will only perceive the aggressive
220. Indeed, this was the position put forward by the Second Circuit in Young. Young v.
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1990). See supra Part IV.A.
221. See Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999); Speet,
726 F.3d at 877-78.
222. Young, 903 F.2d at 153-54.
223. Id. at 153.
224. See id. at 153-54.
225. See id. The Second Circuit focused heavily on the audience based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (stating that in
determining whether expressive conduct is protected as free speech the court must determine
whether "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who

viewed it").
226. See Scorr, supra note 86, at 4.
227. Young, 903 F.2d at 154.
228. Id.
229. See generally Proper Etiquettefor Ignoring Beggars?, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/

topic/inglewood-proper-etiquette-for-ignoring-beggars (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (discussing the
various ways in which people ignore beggars).
230. See generally SCorr, supra note 86, at I (defining aggressive panhandling).
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panhandler's request as harassment and then be more likely to ignore the
request. 2 3 1 If any expressive element contained within the act of begging
is wholly ignored, then the only aspect that is being perceived is the
inexpressive element of soliciting money.2 32
The Young court also considered the intent behind the action in
determining whether the action should be classified as conduct or
speech.23 3 As the Young court noted, "the object of begging and
panhandling is the transfer of money." 234 Therefore, the goal of
panhandling is not to convey some sort of message or to make a statement
to society, such as protesting the Vietnam War235 or fighting
segregation.23 6 Instead, the goal of panhandling is for the panhandler to
acquire money.237 The act of panhandling does not invoke some sort of
message in the target in the same way that wearing a black arm-band
sends a message to an observer that the wearer is protesting the Vietnam
War.23 8 The two actions have inherently different purposes. The purpose
of panhandling is to provide a benefit-usually monetary-to the
panhandler. The purpose of wearing a black arm-band is to communicate
to observers that the wearer opposes the Vietnam War.239 The goal of
protecting the dissemination of information was also a point raised in
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment.24 0 The
primary goal of panhandling is not to disseminate any information on
views or ideas-it is to acquire money.
B. Arguments in Favorof ClassiyingBegging as Speech
The arguments put forth by the Young court represent a minority view
on the issue of whether begging is speech or inexpressive conduct. 24 1The
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See id. at 4-5.
See Young, 903 F.2d at 154.
See id.
Id.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (wearing

black arm-bands to protest the Vietnam War is speech protected by the First Amendment).

236. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (conducting a sit-in to protest
segregation is speech).
237. Young, 903 F.2d at 154. There are even "how to" articles on the internet on how to
make more money begging. How to Panhandle, WiKiHow, http://www.wikihow.com/Panhandle
(last visited Dec. 8, 2015).
238. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504-05.
239. Id. at 504.
240. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)
("[Ciharitable appeals for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech
interests-communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas,
and the advocacy of causes-that are within the protection of the First Amendment.").
241. See Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 874-78 (6th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases from a
variety of circuits and distinguishing Young, 903 F.2d at 155).
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Young court's narrow interpretation of Village of Schaumburg242 placed
too great of an emphasis on the reception by the audience of the beggar's
message and unconstitutionally extended First Amendment protection to
solicitation only as a collective right. 243 Additionally, there are a number
of moral and public policy reasons for classifying begging as speech. 244
Inherently, panhandling requires some degree of communication.24 5
Sometimes this communication may be implied-without the use of
words-by mere gestures. 246 For example, a panhandler extending an
open hand to a passerby communicates that the panhandler is seeking a
donation. 247 Furthermore, "[b]egging frequently is accompanied by
speech indicating the need for food, shelter, clothing, medical care or
transportation." 24 8 Clearly, there is at least some-even if it is rather
limited-expressive communication involved in begging.
Furthermore, whether or not the beggar's target audience actually
perceives the expressive element of communication involved in begging
is irrelevant because many people ignore all forms of solicitation-even
those by charitable organizations. For example, many people ignore all
forms of telemarketing calls, and the National Do-Not-Call Registry 249
was enacted in part to help enable people to more easily avoid or ignore
solicitation attempts. 250 The fact that people might ignore solicitationeven by charitable organizations-does not change the Supreme Court's
ruling in Village of Schaumburg upholding solicitation as protected
speech.25 ' In other words, if a charitable organization's solicitation
attempts are completely ignored, the solicitation is still protected by the
First Amendment.2 5 2 Likewise, if a beggar panhandles on a street corner
242. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
243. See Speet, 726 F.3d at 877 (quoting Young, 903 F.2d at 167 (Meskill, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)) (holding that begging is protected for First Amendment purposes
because .'[t]o hold otherwise would mean that an individual's plight is worthy of less protection
in the eyes of the law than the interests addressed by an organized group'). See also District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-80 (2008).
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. See Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that
begging "usually involves some communication").
246. See id. ("Even without particularized speech, however, the presence of an unkempt and
disheveled person holding out his or her hand or a cup to receive a donation itself conveys a
message of need for support and assistance.").
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 15 U.S.C. § 6151 (2014).
250. See Jason Alderman, How to Stop Annoying Telemarketer Calls, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 23, 2012, 11:34 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jason-alderman/how-to-stopannoying-tele-b_1821828.html (discussing ways to stop telemarketing calls because people find
them to be annoying).
251. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
252. See id.
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and everyone around ignores him or her, the beggar's actions still contain
expressive communication. Therefore, the audience of the action should
not be a dispositive factor when it comes to whether solicitation by an
individual is protected by the First Amendment.
Additionally, simple requests for donations are little different than the
messages conveyed by organized charities. 25 3 Yet, when charitable
organizations request donations on behalf of others, their actions
constitute speech that is protected under the First Amendment. 25 4 While
one (minor) goal of solicitation by charitable organizations may be to
promote awareness about a particular cause, the primary goal of
solicitation is to acquire money. 255 Likewise, panhandlers communicate
a request for donations with the goal of acquiring money. Therefore, the
distinction between solicitation by charitable organizations and
solicitation by individuals is insignificant as both communicate the same
idea-"donate money"-with the same ultimate goal-acquiring
money. 25 6 Essentially, the underlying intent driving solicitation by
charitable organizations and beggars is the exact same. While one might
argue that charitable solicitation is distinguishable because the funds
raised by charitable organizations are contributed toward a specific
political or social cause, this argument is without merit because the funds
donated to panhandlers are contributions toward the social or political
cause of putting an end to poverty and homelessness.
In addition, to distinguish solicitation by charitable organizations as
speech and solicitation by individuals as conduct would require a "middle
man," in the form of an organization, in order to protect solicitation as
speech. To require individuals to form organizations to invoke First
Amendment protection is contrary to constitutional interpretation of
constitutional rights as individual rights.2 57 The Supreme Court has
253. See Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 877 (6th Cir. 2013).
254. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
255. Donations to charitable organizations is big business within the United States-in 2012
"[t]otal giving to charitable organizations was $358.38 billion." Giving Statistics, CHARITY
NAVIGATOR,

http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay-content.view&cpid=42#.UthIF

HmQcVR (last visited Jan. 16, 2014). In fact, the Better Business Bureau has established
Standardsfor Charity Accountability with the purpose of establishing standards to "encourage
fair and honest solicitation practices, to promote ethical conduct by charitable organizations and
to advance support of philanthropy." BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, STANDARDS FOR CHARITY
ACCOUNTABILITY Preface (2003), available at http://www.bbb.org/new-york-city/charitiesdonors/standards-for-charity-accountability/.

256. See Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We see little
difference between those who solicit for organized charities and those who solicit for themselves
in regard to the message conveyed. The former are communicating the needs of others while the
latter are communicating their personal needs.... The distinction is not a significant one . . . .").
257. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-80 (2008) (stating that the
Constitution protects "individual rights, not 'collective' rights, or rights that may be exercised
only through participation in some corporate body").
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specifically rejected the notion that individuals might be required to form
groups to receive constitutional protection. 258
There are also moral grounds for extending First Amendment
protection to solicitation by beggars. 259 From a utilitarian perspective,
criminalizing an activity that provides the only means of survival for a
desperate individual cannot possibly generate the greatest social benefit
to society when the positive benefits are relatively insignificant in
comparison. 260 Additionally, from a sentimentalist or moral sense theory
perspective, it seems inherently wrong to refuse to protect the means of
survival of an individual who is forced to beg and rely on the charity of
others merely to subsist-just because begging might make a few people
uncomfortable from time to time. 26 1
Overall, begging by an individual should be protected as speech under
the First Amendment. Begging contains at the very least some amount of
expression. 262 For example, the presence of a beggar contains an
expressive message of making the issue of poverty salient to the
community. 263 Additionally, whether the audience perceives the target
message should not be a dispositive factor in deciding to extend
protection. Solicitation by beggars and charitable organizations both have
the same ultimate goal-to acquire money. Finally, there are moral and
constitutional issues presented by extending First Amendment protection
to solicitation by charitable organization and not to beggars. 2 64
VI.

ANTI-BEGGING LAWS AND THE PUBLIC FORUM

Extending First Amendment protection to begging does not fully
resolve the issue of whether anti-begging laws are constitutional.
Resolving this inquiry requires a determination of whether the places that
beggars frequent most 26 5 are considered public fora because regulations
258. See id.
259. See supra Part II.B.

260. For a description of the positive benefits of anti-begging laws, see supra Part II.B.
261. See Paul, supra note 88.
262. See Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 877-78 (6th Cir. 2013); Loper v. N.Y.C. Police
Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993).
263. See Loper, 999 F.2d at 704 ("Begging frequently is accompanied by speech indicating
the need for food, shelter, clothing, medical care or transportation.").
264. "'[B]egging is indistinguishable from charitable solicitation for First Amendment
purposes. To hold otherwise would mean that an individual's plight is worthy of less protection
in the eyes of the law than the interests addressed by an organized group."' Speet, 726 F.3d at 877
(quoting Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 167 (2d Cir. 1990) (Meskill, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
265. For a list of areas commonly frequented by panhandlers, see Scorr, supra note 86, at
9. This Note primarily considers public sidewalks to be the place that beggars frequent most. See
id.
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on free speech in public fora are subject to strict scrutiny, 266 while
regulations on speech outside of a public forum are subject to rational
basis review. 267 Therefore, if the places that beggars frequent most are
considered public fora, municipalities that pass anti-begging laws must
narrowly tailor them and also have a "compelling state interest" to
withstand strict scrutiny review. 26 8
While the Supreme Court has rejected an argument that all
government-owned sidewalks constitute public fora, most public
sidewalks do qualify as public fora. 269 The "quintessential" public fora
include "public streets, parks, and (some) sidewalks." 27 0 As a result,
many of the places frequented by beggars would likely be considered
public fora. 271' However, a public forum is not created "whenever
members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or
operated by the Government." 272 Moreover, the Court has recognized
only "traditional" public fora-those that "have historically been made
available for speech activity." 273 Since most public sidewalks do qualify
as "traditional" public fora 274 and begging commonly occurs on public
sidewalks, 275 anti-begging laws that restrict begging on or near public
sidewalks will be subject to strict scrutiny and require the state to
demonstrate a "compelling state interest" and the restriction be "narrowly
drawn" in order to withstand a constitutional challenge.2 76
In contrast, if the places that beggars frequent are not "traditional"
public fora, municipalities need only show that a regulation limiting
begging in those areas be reasonable and subject to rational basis
266. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990) (holding that regulations on
speech in public fora, "such as public streets and parks, [are] examined under strict scrutiny").
267. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992)
(holding that restrictions on speech that is protected under the First Amendment outside ofa public
forum "need only satisfy a requirement of reasonableness").
268. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
269. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727. In Kokinda, the Court rejected an argument that a sidewalk
on Postal Service property constituted a public forum in part because it was not a "public
passageway" or "thoroughfare." Id.
270. TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORs: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN

PUBLIC PLACES 55-56 (2009).
271. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727; SCO'rr, supra note 86, at 9.
272. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976).
273. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-81 (1992)
(finding that airport terminals are not public fora because they are not a "traditional public
forum"). One scholar has suggested that all "places of modernity-shopping malls, airports,
transportation terminals and facilities, highway rest stops-cannot achieve 'quintessential'
[public] forum status" because they have not been around long enough to be considered traditional
public fora. ZICK, supra note 270, at 56. However, public beaches have also been categorized as
public fora. Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 1999).
274. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727.
275. See ScoTr, supra note 86, at 9.
276. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
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review.2 7 7 For example, beggars also frequently panhandle: at
intersections with traffic signals, on or near public transportation, near
ATMs, and near freeway entrances and exits.2 78 These areas would
probably not qualify as public fora under Supreme Court First
Amendment jurisprudence because they are not "quintessential" public
fora that have "historically been made available for speech activity."279
For the most part, "these places have not been around long enough to
warrant ... treatment" as public fora. 2 80 Additionally, common sense and
experience dictate that most of these places have never been traditionally
boycotts, rallies, or
activities-protests,
used
for speech
demonstrations-in the same way that public parks, streets, and
sidewalks have been used for these activities. For example, when
planning a protest of an action of government, protesters do not plan to
stage their protest on a freeway entrance or exit-they plan to hold their
protest at the seat of government. 28 1 As a result, these other places that
are commonly frequented by beggars would not likely qualify as public
fora, so restrictions on begging at these locations need only survive
rational basis review. 2 82
If First Amendment protection is extended to begging, then the key
consideration in examining the constitutionality of anti-begging laws will
be to consider the locations that are the subject of the restrictions. 2 83 if
the anti-begging law restricts begging in a public forum, such as in a
public park, sidewalk, or street, then the law will be subject to strict
scrutiny and only be upheld if it satisfies a "compelling state interest" and
is "narrowly drawn" to achieve that interest. 2 8 4 On the other hand, if the

anti-begging law restricts begging outside of a public forum, then the
restriction need only be reasonable because it will only be subject to
rational basis review. 285
VII. SUGGESTED MUNICIPAL REFORMS

Extending First Amendment protection to begging will affect a
277. Int'l Soc 'yfor Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 683.

278. Scorr, supra note 86, at 9.
279. See Int'l Soc 'yfor Krishna Consciousness,Inc., 505 U.S. at 680; ZICK, supra note 270,

at 55-56.
280. ZICK, supra note 270, at 56.
281. For an interesting graphic of all worldwide protests since 1979, see J. Dana Stuster,
Mapped: Every Protest on the Planet Since 1979, FOREIGN POLY

(Aug. 23, 2013),

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/23/mapped-every-protest-on-the-planet-since-1979/.
282. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 683.

283. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725-27 (1990).
284. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
285. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730.
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number of anti-begging laws that are currently in force in a number of
municipalities. 28 6 Some of these municipalities will likely need to amend
their laws in order to withstand a constitutional challenge. In order to
withstand a constitutional attack on First Amendment grounds,
municipalities will need to pass regulations that are "narrowly drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest." 287
Under a public forum analysis, it is unlikely that any highly restrictive
anti-begging lawS 2 8 8 would pass constitutional muster. 2 89 For example,
Montpelier, Vermont would need to amend its ordinance to change its
anti-begging regulations from a city-wide public ban on begging to
specific targeted areas with legitimate purposes. 290 Under public forum
analysis, a city-wide ban on begging in all public places would almost
undoubtedly fail to be considered "narrowly tailored" in a constitutional
challenge.

However, a less restrictive anti-begging law 29 2 that restricts speech in
a public forum would likely pass constitutional muster so long as it is
narrowly tailored to address the "time, place, or manner" 293 of begging
and serves a compelling state interest.2 9' For example, Los Angeles and
Chicago 295 have anti-begging laws that would likely be upheld as
constitutional-even under strict scrutiny. Neither city prohibits begging
on a city-wide basis; instead, both Los Angeles and Chicago restrict
begging at specific locations. 296 Even under strict scrutiny, an ordinance
that restricts begging near banks, restaurants, bus stops, and ATMs would
likely be upheld as constitutional because these are areas where people
286. For examples of some of these anti-begging laws, see supra Part 1. See also A Dream
Denied, supra note 31, at 135-45; Homes Not Handcuffs, supra note 11, at 165-71.
287. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 678 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
288. See supra Part I.A.
289. See Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 879-80 (6th Cir. 2013).
290. MONTPELIER, VT., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. VII, § 11-708 (1996); see also
supra Part I.A.2.
291. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 676; see also Speet, 726 F.3d
at 879-80 (holding that a state-wide ban on begging is unconstitutional because it is not narrowly
tailored to serve its legitimate state interests).
292. See supra Part I.B.
293. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
294. Fort Lauderdale, Florida's anti-begging ordinance was upheld as constitutional because
the Eleventh Circuit found the ordinance to be "narrowly tailored to serve the City's interest in
providing a safe, pleasant environment and eliminating nuisance activity on the beach." Smith v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (1lth Cir. 1999). This decision has been subject to
criticism. See generally Ann Marie Cummins, Note: Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale: The
Eleventh Circuit Casts a "Net Making Easy the Roundup ofSo Called Undesirables,"10 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 165,178-79 (2000).
295. See supra Part I.B.3.
296. See supra Part I.B.3.
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are very likely to be confronted by panhandlers and have safety and
economic concerns. 297 For example, if panhandlers are near an ATM,
passers-by are unlikely to use the ATM for fear of being accosted after
making a withdrawal. 298 Furthermore, a number of these locations are not
likely to be classified as public fora, 29 9 so a municipality would only need
show that the anti-begging law is reasonable because the law would only
be subject to rational basis review. 300 Therefore, less restrictive antibegging laws would likely be upheld because they are probably narrowly
tailored to withstand strict scrutiny or restrict begging outside of a public
forum.
Overall, all municipality-wide bans on begging will probably be found
to be unconstitutional because they would necessarily restrict speech in a
public forum and fail to pass strict scrutiny review. 30 1 Municipality-wide
bans on begging-even if they serve a compelling state interest-are not
narrowly tailored to meet their goal and thus fail to withstand strict
scrutiny. 302 Instead, anti-begging laws that restrict begging-even in a
public forum-at specific times, specific places, and manners303 such as
those enacted by Chicago, Illinois 304 or Los Angeles, California 305 would
likely be upheld as constitutional because they are narrowly tailored to
achieve their compelling state interest in public safety and economic
concerns. 306
In drafting or amending an anti-begging law, a municipality would
likely withstand a constitutional challenge by narrowly tailoring
restrictions on begging in public fora, such as public sidewalks, 307 in
accordance with particularized safety and economic concerns. 308 For
example, an anti-begging law that prohibited begging on public sidewalks
in front of elementary schools would likely be narrowly tailored and serve
297. See SCOTr, supra note 86, at 9 (stating that restaurants, bus stops, and ATMs are places
where panhandlers are common).
298. ATMs are a common location for panhandlers because the people who use ATMs for
a withdrawal cannot "say they do not have any money to give." Id.
299. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1992).
300. See id. at 683.
301. For example, the Sixth Circuit in Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 880 (6th Cir. 2013),
recently held that Michigan's statewide ban on begging was unconstitutional.
302. See Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 879-80 (6th Cir. 2013).
303. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
304. CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE, ch. 8-4, § 025(b)(1) (2004).
305. L.A., CAL., L.A. MUN. CODE ch. IV, art. 1, § 41.59 (1997).
306. See Speet, 726 F.3d at 879-80; Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956
(11th Cir. 1999).
307. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990); see also supraPart VI.
308. See Smith, 177 F.3d at 956-57 (holding that an anti-begging ordinance that restricts
begging in beach areas is "narrowly tailored to serve the City's interest in providing a safe,
pleasant environment"); Alfs, supra note 115 (discussing the negative impact that the presence of
panhandlers has on business).
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a legitimate compelling state interest in ensuring the safety of children to
withstand strict scrutiny review. 3 0 9 The municipality has far more leeway
in restricting begging outside of public fora because the municipality
need only show that the restriction is reasonable. 31 0 For example, a
restriction prohibiting begging within fifteen feet of all ATMs at all times
would almost certainly withstand rational basis review because the
restriction would serve the reasonable purpose of attempting to deter
crime near ATMs.3 1 1 Thus, to restrict begging in a public forum, the
municipality must narrowly tailor the restriction and the restriction must
serve a compelling state interest, while a restriction on begging outside
of a public forum need only be reasonable. 3 1 2

CONCLUSION

While there are legitimate societal interests for limiting begging in
public places, these interests do not provide reasonable grounds to
completely prohibit begging in public spaces. 3 13 State laws should not
punish those who require the charity of others to survive.3 14 There is no
compelling or constitutionally permissible reason to require a "middle
man" in the form of a charitable organization to protect solicitation of
alms by an individual as free speech under the First Amendment. 3 15
Society cannot simply sweep the poor and homeless "under the rug" to
make the problem go away. 3 16
309. In the wake of the school shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown,
Connecticut in December 2012 and others across the United States, a court reviewing such a
statute would almost certainly find the state interest in ensuring the safety of children to be

compelling. See Joseph Straw, School Shootings Happen Every 10 Days Since Sandy Hook, Gun
Control Groups Find, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 12, 2014, 10:03 PM), http://www.nydailynews.
com/news/crime/school-shootings-happen-10-days-gun-control-group s-article-1.1612349.
310. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992).
311. Los Angeles, California has enacted such an ordinance. L.A., CAL., L.A. MUN. CODE

ch. IV, art. 1, § 41.59(c)(1) (1997).
312. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 680-81, 683.
313. See Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 879-80 (6th Cir. 2013).
314. See supra Part II.B.

315. See Speet, 726 F.3d at 877; Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 167 (2d Cir.
1990) (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-80 (2008) (stating that the Constitution protects "individual rights, not
'collective' rights, or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some corporate
body").
316. However, some cities have tried to temporarily hide the problem. See Vickie Elmer, In
Detroit, a Super Bowl Timeout for the Homeless, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2006, at A.02 (discussing
Detroit, Michigan's attempt to hide its homeless population when the city hosted the Super Bowl
in 2006); Scott Keyes, Is Washington DC Trying to Hide Its Homeless Population During
Inauguration?, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 19, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/
economy/2013/01/19/146941 1/dc-homeless-inauguration/# (discussing Washington, D.C.'s
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The Supreme Court and all circuit courts should hold that the First
Amendment protection of soliciting alms extends to individuals and
subject all anti-begging laws that restrict begging in a public forum to
strict scrutiny. The law should reflect the reality that beggars need the
protection of the First Amendment. 3 17 To forego this result would be to
deprive those forced to beg of their only means of survival. The least we
can do as a society is allow the poor and homeless, like Mr. Speet, 3 18 to
hold up a sign and ask for a helping hand. First Amendment protection
would accomplish this goal.

attempt to hide its homeless population during the 2013 presidential inauguration).
317. See supra Part V.B.
318. See Speet, 726 F.3d at 871.

